India Has Put the Indus Waters Treaty in Abeyance: Implications for Pakistan

The single biggest threat to Pakistan's water security is not a sudden Indian decision to cut off supplies but a gradual shift in the strategic hydro-politics of the Indus Basin that will require immediate engineering, institutional and diplomatic response.

While the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is one of the world's most enduring multinational accords, the very fact that India placed the treaty "in abeyance" in April 2025 means that Pakistan must assess the potential impacts not only on its diplomacy but also on its agriculture, energy and climate security.

One of IWT's most remarkable features has been that, despite several major regional wars and a succession of hostile governments in both Pakistan and India, the treaty has provided a stable and predictable legal and technical framework for the management of the Indus Basin waters. This has been critical for the survival of Pakistan's agricultural development, energy production and ecosystem health for over six decades. But now, for the first time since its near-unanimous adoption in 1960, the treaty's technical and legal infrastructure faces a serious political challenge.

For Pakistan, the key issue is that the Indus Basin is the backbone of the national economy. Nearly 90 percent of Pakistan's food grain production from wheat and rice, as well as its cotton and sugar output, depends on the waters from the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab Rivers. Major dams such as Tarbela and Mangla not only help to regulate river flows but also generate close to 50 percent of Pakistan's electricity. In addition, reliable access to the waters of the Indus Basin underpins Pakistan's resilience to climate change and natural variability. Therefore, any shifts in the patterns of water supply timing and volumes can undermine Pakistan's agriculture, hydro-power generation and freshwater resources.

It is important to note that the scenario of India totally stopping the flows to Pakistan is unlikely if not impossible. While India may attempt to restrict the water supplies to Pakistan, the engineering and topographic realities of the Indus Basin suggest that there are physical limitations to such restrictions. More importantly, India has little economic incentive to do so since India has far fewer irrigation needs than Pakistan and derives limited electric power generation benefits from the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab Rivers.

By notifying the government of Pakistan that India was placing its obligations under IWT "in abeyance", New Delhi has in effect declared its right to exploit to the maximum extent possible the waters within its jurisdiction. This is likely to lead to increased Indian investments in canal, hydropower, reservoir and irrigation infrastructure to store and use more water. For Pakistan, the most pressing concern is that the timing of water deliveries to its western rivers is extremely important for its agriculture. Even relatively small changes in the flows can disrupt the delicate sowing, growing and harvesting cycles. Therefore, shifts in temporal distribution may have more significant impacts on Pakistan's agriculture, irrigation, canal operations and hydropower than changes in the overall volumes.

In addition to agriculture, the disruption of the established inflow regimes can impact Tarbela Hydropower Station and Mangla Dam, which could reduce the overall electric power generation capacity of Pakistan. Moreover, reduced freshwater inflows could diminish Pakistan's resilience to climate variations and stresses.

Environmental security considerations are also important since the flows of freshwater to the Indus Delta have been dropping sharply over the last several years due to reduced outflows. This, in turn, has led to increased salinity levels in the estuary, threatened the region's mangrove forests and jeopardized coastal fisheries. A comprehensive assessment of Pakistan's water security challenges must also recognize that, regardless of developments in the Indus, Pakistan's internal water management problems are even more acute. Significant amounts of water are currently lost due to the poor design and aging infrastructure in Pakistan's irrigation system.

At the same time, groundwater extraction in the country has skyrocketed over the last decade, with largely dire consequences for local aquifers. Meanwhile, the storage capacity of Pakistan's reservoirs has been on a steady decline due to sedimentation, and the country's irrigation efficiency remains substantially lower than that of many other nations. Thus, in order to effectively respond to India's 2025 decision to place the IWT "in abeyance", Pakistan needs to move beyond the immediate diplomatic implications and begin contemplating a comprehensive transformation of its water sector. The country needs to prioritize expanding reservoir storage capacity to ensure food, energy and water security under changing climatic conditions.

Existing reservoirs need to be maintained and their storage capacity augmented if possible. At the same time, Pakistan needs to invest in making the Indus Basin Irrigation System more efficient and modern. Upgrading the canal networks and irrigation infrastructure with cutting-edge technology and water-saving methodologies should be a key focus area. Pakistan needs to expand its use of precision irrigation methods, especially in arid regions, making every drop of water count.

Groundwater management in Pakistan needs to become a key policy and administrative priority. Pakistan's groundwater has become a huge and mostly hidden resource that requires extensive policy and institutional reforms.

Climate change is another important consideration. With the glaciers in the Indus Basin shrinking and the regional climate patterns becoming more unpredictable, Pakistan must prepare itself for even more drastic swings in river flows and water availability. Better still, Pakistan should invest in scientific research to make its water management practices as informed as possible. By focusing on these areas, Pakistan can transform its agriculture and energy sectors, as well as its natural environment.

With regard to managing the immediate tension with India over the future of IWT, Pakistan must continue to pursue a policy of diplomatic engagements and negotiations on the treaty's future. The basic principles of international water law stress that states sharing a river basin must negotiate on the basis of equitable and reasonable use, as well as the principle of no significant harm to other states. The abeyance of IWT does not represent the end of the treaty but rather a turning point, one that will test the resolve of all stakeholders.

Whether it leads to a renegotiation of the treaty and an evolution of the Indus Waters Treaty regime or the replacement of IWT with a new framework depends on the actions of all the stakeholders. However, one thing is clear: Pakistan's water security will depend on sustained cooperative efforts, as well as Pakistan's own engineering and technical capabilities.

In this regard, Pakistan should continue to engage with India, as well as other international stakeholders, to find ways to maximize mutual benefits for both nations. A comprehensive technical exchange on the management of the Indus Waters Treaty is critical to ensuring long term security for both countries. After all, the Indus River has served as a lifeline for Pakistani people for centuries and its bounties will continue to nourish the people of Pakistan, as well as the people of India, for centuries to come.